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Abstract 
STV is often extolled because it allows voters to express a nuanced choice, but is 
criticised for being too confusing. In practice the system is little used, but evidence 
from where it is indicates much depends on how voters choose to use it. STV was 
used for the first time in Scottish local elections in 2007, providing valuable new 
evidence on how voters respond to the system. We use survey data to examine the 
incidence of various indicators of apparent failure by Scottish voters to exploit STV, 
and compare both the levels and patterns of incidence with equivalent data for 
Ireland. We find little sign of confusion in either country, but significant evidence of 
ballot order effects in Scotland. 
Keywords 
Single Transferable Vote; Voter Competence; Ballot Order Effect; Scotland; Ireland 
 
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) in multi-member constituencies is little 
used in public elections. Currently, just two relatively small European countries 
deploy it to elect the principal house of their statewide legislature  W Ireland and 
Malta (Reynolds et al., 2004). Yet conceptually the system is of particular interest. 
Under it, voters formally vote for candidates, not parties, doing so by placing them in 
rank order. Unlike (typically proportional) systems that use open or flexible lists, 
expressing a preference for one of the candidates nominated by a particular party 
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐďĞŝŶŐ
elected (Cox, 1997; Shugart, 2005).  Yet at the same time, STV usually produces 
results that are reasonably proportional to the total of (first preference) votes cast 
ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐĞƚŽĨĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ, as a result, it is widely regarded as a 
proportional system (Lijphart, 1994; Carter and Farrell, 2010). The system is thus 
 ‘ĨĂŝƌ ?ƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐǇĞƚĂůƐŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚŽŝƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ
support expressed for individual candidates. 
 This combination of attributes has won STV many admirers, not least within 
academic political science (Lijphart and Grofman, 1984). Two reasons are commonly 
put forward as to why it should be preferred to other systems of proportional 
representation. First, the system maximizes voter choice (Lakeman, 1974). Should 
they so wish, voters can express support for candidates from different parties and 
ĐĂŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞďĂĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƐŽŵĞŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƐĂĨĞ
in the knowledge that doing so will not be taken in any way as an endorsement of 
any of the other candidates nominated by that party. Second, STV ensures that every 
legislator is individually accountable to voters and no candidate can secure election 
simply by hanging on to the coattails of their party or fellow, more popular 
candidates (Bogdanor, 1984). That, among other things, means that system would 
seem to provide quite strong incentives to candidates to secure a personal vote by, 
for example, providing good constituency service (Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Bowler 
and Grofman, 2000a; Marsh, 2000; Marsh, 2007; though see also Carey and Shugart, 
1995).   
 Yet whether these apparent advantages are realised depends on how the 
system is used; that is, on the strategies that are deployed by the parties and on how 
voters decide to use the opportunities afforded to them by the bĂůůŽƚƉĂƉĞƌ ?sŽƚĞƌƐ ?
ability to choose will be constrained if parties opt to nominate no more candidates 
than they would hope to get elected. Parties may also try to persuade their 
supporters to exercise their choice in a particular way by issuing a recommendation 
ĂƐƚŽŚŽǁƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚŽƌĚĞƌƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ?'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?&ĂƌƌĞůůĞƚĂů ? ?
1996; Marsh, 2000), thereby potentially making it less likely that voters exercise 
their own judgment. Parties may even advise their supporters to give later 
preferences to the candidates of one party rather another. In any event, irrespective 
of what parties might do, voters who have no wish to do anything other than back a 
particular party may well be disinclined to express anything like a subtle, nuanced 
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choice. They may even be take the easiest route to completing their ballot paper and 
simply vote for the candidates of their preferred party in the order in which they 
appear on the ballot paper (Robson and Walsh, 1974; Marsh, 1981; Ortega Villodres 
and de la Puerta, 2004; Ortega Villodres, 2008).  
 Indeed, we already know from the relatively limited experience of STV to 
date that different electorates can respond to the system very differently (Bowler 
and Grofman, 2000b; Farrell, 2010). In Ireland, nearly all voters express more than 
one preference, and while most cast some kind of preference for all of the 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶŚĂůĨƉůĂĐĞĂůůŽĨƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
candidates above those of any other party (Marsh et al., 2008).  For a significant 
body of Irish voters, the qualities and local connections of candidates matter above 
and beyond their party affiliation. On the other hand, in Malta the presence of a very 
strong two-party system means that very few voters give any kind of preference to 
the candidates of more than one party, a behaviour that is both encouraged by and 
reflected in the fact that the candidates of each party are grouped together on the 
ballot paper (Hirczy de Miño and Lane, 2000).1  
 Moreover, it is sometimes disputed whether the potential for more nuanced 
candidate centred voting created by STV is necessarily a feature to be admired. 
Encouraging candidates to curry favour with voters in a particular locality may be 
thought to encourage clientelism, if not corruption, and a tendency for elected 
representatives to focus on advancing the particular needs and interests of their 
constituency rather than scrutinizing the government and evaluating national public 
policy (Carty 1981; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Fitzgerald, 2003; Shugart, 2005; 
Arbuthnott, 2006). The focus on candidates may mean political parties are 
weakened and prove ineffective at aggregating public policy options, a role they 
need to perform if voters are to have an effective influence on the direction of public 
policy. Meanwhile, the relative complexity of the system could well be thought a 
source of irritation if not indeed of potential confusion amongst voters, a concern 
that was particularly eloquently expressed by the Independent Commission on the 
Voting System created by the then UK Labour government following its election 
victory in 1997: 
The Commission sees the extension of voter choice as highly desirable up to 
the point at which the average voter is able and eager meaningfully to 
exercise choice, both between and within parties. But that where the choice 
offered resembles a caricature of an over-zealous American breakfast waiter 
going on posing an indefinite number of unwanted options, it becomes both 
an exasperation and an incitement to the giving of rĂŶĚŽŵĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ Q
exasperation may discourage going to the polls at all and randomness lead to 
the casting of perverse or at least meaningless votes. Some people want to 
be able to choose between candidates of the same party, but many are 
interested only in voting for parties, and would not appreciate being forced 
into choosing between candidates of the same party about each of whom 
they know little. (Jenkins, 1998: paragraph 95) 
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 Still, STV spread its tentacles a little wider when in 2007 the system was 
introduced (in place of single member plurality) for elections to local councils in 
Scotland  W a decision made by the devolved Scottish government in Edinburgh rather 
than the UK government in London.2 ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ? ?ůŽĐĂů
authorities were contested in three or four member wards  W a size dictated by 
>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐǁŝƐŚ ?ĂƐĂƚƚŚĂƚƚŝŵĞƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƉĂƌƚǇŝŶ ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ )ƚŽŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞƚŚĞ
increased proportionality that the switch to the system would generate (Clark and 
Bennie, 2008).  One potential consequence of this was, of course, that the number 
of candidates nominated by the parties  W and thus the extent of intraparty choice 
available to voters  W could well be quite limited. 
 Despite this particular feature of its implementation, there is good reason 
why the way in which voters in Scotland responded to the introduction of STV is of 
general interest to students of the system. Although, as in the rest of Great Britain, 
partisanship has weakened in Scotland during the post-war era (Curtice et al., 2009), 
parties could still be thought to have a stronger hold on the affections of the public 
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇĚŽŝŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇůŽĐĂůŝƐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ŽŐĚĂŶŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚƚŚĞ
same time, however  W and in sharp contrast to the position in Malta  W the days when 
the country had a two party system dominated by the Conservatives and Labour are 
long over. Not only are the Liberal Democrats important players, but so also are the 
pro-independence Scottish National Party, while a number of other parties, most 
notably the Greens, have also been able to secure some representation in the 
Scottish Parliament. Meanwhile, candidates were placed on the STV ballot paper in 
alphabetical order of family name without any grouping by party. Thus Scotland 
affords a context in which party is thought likely to matter, but also an environment 
in which voters have a wide choice of effective parties and where the ballot 
structure does not emphasise the role of parties at all. It thus might be thought to 
provide evidence of what happens when voters are given an unalloyed opportunity 
to express a nuanced electoral choice in a political context that is more typical of 
that found in mature European democracies than either the increasingly weak party 
system in Ireland or the unusually strong two-party one on Malta. 
 In this article we examine how voters in Scotland used the ballot paper in the 
2007 local elections and systematically compare their behaviour with that of voters 
in parliamentary elections in the Republic of Ireland, focusing on the 2002 Irish 
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƐƚŽĚĂƚĞ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĂĐĐŽƌĚƐ
most closely with the expectations of the advocates of STV and the system there 
also uses both an alphabetically ordered ballot paper and relatively small 
constituencies (electing between three and five representatives), the country 
provides a valuable benchmark against which to assess what happened in Scotland. 
Of course, in so doing we need to be aware that we are comparing an electorate 
with eighty yearƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ^dsǁŝƚŚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƵƐŝŶŐŝƚŝŶĂƉƵďůŝĐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
for the first time.3 It might be thought that first time around voters will not have fully 
appreciated the opportunities for expressing a more nuanced choice that STV brings, 
and especially so given that the 2007 local elections were held on the same day as an 
election to the Scottish Parliament that was not only more likely to be more salient 
ŝŶǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐďƵƚalso was conducted under an AMS system that only required 
them to mark their ďĂůůŽƚƉĂƉĞƌƐǁŝƚŚĂŶ ‘y ? ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ
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evidence that voters in Scotland proved particularly slow at taking the opportunity 
afforded by a double ballot AMS system to vote for different parties on the two 
ballots when they first had the opportunity to do so in the 1999 Scottish Parliament 
election (Curtice et al., 2009). We would thus anticipate that if voters in Scotland are 
inclined to use the opportunities under STV to express a more nuanced choice, there 
should be clear evidence of them doing so the first time around. 
2. Data 
Our data come from the 2007 Scottish Social Attitudes survey and the 2002 Irish 
National Election Study, both of which interviewed probability samples of their 
respective populations face to face in the weeks immediately after polling day (for 
further details see Curtice et al., 2009; Marsh et al., 2008). Both surveys invited 
respondents who said they had voted in the relevant STV election to record how 
they had cast their preferences by completing a mock ballot paper. This ballot paper 
listed all the names and party labels of those standing in their local ward or 
constituency.4 A total of 703 respondents to the Scottish Social Attitudes survey and 
1,831 respondents to the Irish National Election Study completed that paper.5 At the 
same time, in order to facilitate a comparative study, a number of key questions 
ĂďŽƵƚǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
earlier Irish study were replicated on the Scottish survey. 
These data have some disadvantages  W voters may fail to record some of their 
(lower) preferences through forgetfulness or fatigue. There is also the potential for 
sampling error and bias. Meanwhile, some of the behaviours in which we are 
interested are at least partly discernible from the published results, especially as all 
of the ballots in Scotland were counted electronically as were those in three 
constituencies in Ireland, a procedure that means that full information on the 
number of preferences expressed by voters was both gathered and published. 
However comparison of the number of preferences expressed by respondents to the 
Scottish survey with these published details reveals only a small discrepancy (Curtice 
et al., 2009: 161-2), while, where the comparison can be made, the same is also true 
of the Irish study, (Marsh et al 2008: 29). Meanwhile the considerable advantage of 
the mock ballots is that we can use them alongside other data from the two surveys 
to identify the kinds of individuals who engage in different kinds of behaviours and it 
is this issue that is of central concern here. 
3. Questions 
As we have seen, advocates of STV laud the fact that it affords voters the chance to 
cast more than one preference, in so doing to express support for more than one 
party, and even to take little account of party affiliation in deciding the order in 
which they place candidates. Meanwhile, we have also noted the concern that exists 
that voters might do no more than rank the candidates of their preferred party in 
the order in which they appear on the ballot paper.  These observations mean we 
ĐĂŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĨŽƵƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ďǇǀŽƚĞƌƐƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ
to express a nuanced choice:  
a. Voting for just one candidate 
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b. Voting for just one party 
c. Voting the straight party ticket, that is placing all the candidates of one party 
above those of all others. 
d. Voting in alphabetical order. 
We thus assess the incidence of each of these behaviours in Scotland in 2007 and 
examine whether they are more common amongst some kinds of voters than others. 
At the same time, we consider how similar the incidence of these behaviours and 
the kinds of voters amongst whom they were most common was to the position in 
Ireland in 2002.  In examining the kinds of voters amongst whom these behaviours 
were more common, we assess three possible sets of reasons that might promote 
their incidence. Two of these refer to the characteristics of voters, while the other 
concerns the context in which they are asked to vote. 
First of all, as suggested by the UK voting commission, we might anticipate that 
some voters have fewer resources and thus less capacity to exercise the relatively 
complex judgement that exercising choice under STV demands. Voters need not only 
to decide which party they like most, but their relative feelings about a number of 
different parties. At the same time, if alongside their consideration of the parties 
voters are to place the candidates in order of preference in an informed manner, 
they need to become aware of the qualities, stances and record of the individual 
candidates as well. Voters with fewer cognitive resources might well find this all a bit 
too much, and express only the simplest of choices such as placing the candidates of 
their preferred party in the order in which they appear on the ballot paper (Miller 
and Krosnick, 1998; King and Leigh, 2009). 
Meanwhile, one obvious reason why voters might not want to vote in a nuanced 
fashion is that they have a strong sense of attachment to or identification with a 
party, and thus all that they want to do is to back that party. They will thus lack the 
motivation to give any kind of preference to a candidate of any other party. 
Certainly, studies of voting on the occasion of multiple elections in the United States, 
and under the two-ballot Additional Member System (including in Scotland) all 
indicate that strong partisans are less likely than those with little or no sense of 
attachment to a party to split their tickets and give a vote to more than one party 
(Beck et al., 1992; Burden and Kimball, 2002; Karp et al., 2002; Gschwend, 2007; 
Curtice et al. 2009). 
However, how people vote under STV is also likely to depend on the context in 
which they cast their ballot; that is the structure of the contest in their particular 
ward or constituency. There are two aspects of this that are potentially important  W 
the nomination strategies of the parties and the relative electoral strength of those 
parties locally. A voter whose preferred party nominates more than one candidate in 
their district has, on the one hand, less reason to cast only one preference  W because 
he or she will likely ǁĂŶƚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌƵŶŶŝŶŐŵĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ) W 
but, on the other hand, seems more likely to vote for one party only. Similarly, a 
voter whose preferred party is strong locally has less reason to vote for more than 
one party, as it is relatively unlikely that their vote will be wasted (that is become 
wholly non-transferable) as a result.  Such a voter also has more reason to cast a 
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straight party ticket vote  W in these circumstances giving a second or even a third 
preference to candidates from that party is more likely to prove effective in helping 
it secure a second (or third) seat. 
Which of these three sets of considerations proves to be the more influential is 
clearly important to any evaluation of the merits of STV.  If voters do indeed respond 
to the structure of the contest in their particular constituency, it would indicate that 
voters are relatively inclined to use the more nuanced features of the system when it 
is likely to prove effective to do so, and thus demonstrate a considerable degree of 
competence in completing their ballots. On the other hand, if voters with less 
apparent capacity seem less willing and able to exploit the system, even when it is 
appropriate to do so, this might be thought to constitute evidence of potential 
confusion. Or perhaps for many voters the subtleties of STV simply pass them by, 
irrespective of where they live or their cognitive capacity, because all they want to 
do to express their support for one particular party. 
4. How Did Voters Use the Ballot Paper? 
Table 1 shows the incidence in both Scotland and Ireland of the four kinds of 
behaviour in which we are interested. As indicated earlier, by voting the straight 
party ticket we mean that where the party for which a voter cast a first preference 
ǀŽƚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĂƚǀŽƚĞƌĂŶŬĞĚĂůůŽĨƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
candidates above those of any other party. Meanwhile, a voter is said to have voted 
down the ballot paper when the candidate to whom they gave their first preference 
was positioned higher up the ballot paper than the candidate to whom they gave 
their second preference. 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
All four behaviours were more common in Scotland in 2007 than in Ireland in 2002.  
However, most Scottish voters cast more than one preference. Moreover, most gave 
a preference to more than one party, while over two in five of those whose first 
preference party nominated more than one candidate did not rank all of the 
candidates of their first preference party above those of any other party.  Thus while 
voters in Scotland appear to have been more partisan than their Irish counterparts, 
many did use the opportunity provided by the system to express more nuanced 
choices. On the other hand, there is some evidence of alphabetical or donkey voting 
in the Scottish local elections. If ballot position had no effect on how people voted, 
then only half of those who expressed more than one preference should have given 
their second preference vote to a candidate placed lower down the ballot paper 
than the one to whom they gave their first preference. This proves to be the case in 
Ireland  W but as many as 60% voted that way in Scotland. Indeed, the election results 
themselves in the 2007 Scottish local elections show that where a party put up more 
than one candidate, a candidate placed lower on the ballot paper was less likely to 
be elected (Denver et al., 2009; Electoral Reform Society, 2008). 
5.1 Confusion Reigns? 
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But does this mean that people in Scotland were particularly confused about the 
system, and especially so those who might be thought less able to cope with a more 
complicated system? Table 2 shows the incidence of the first three of our behaviours 
broken down by four indicaƚŽƌƐŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ capacity to cope with a more 
complex method of voting.  (We will return to the incidence of alphabetical voting 
below.) These indicators are level of education, the number of correct answers to a 
short quiz about the devolution settlement in Scotland/political affairs in Ireland and  
(for Scotland only) responses to two questions about the perceived difficulty of 
completing the STV ballot paper and of understanding how votes are translated into 
seats.6 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
There are some indications that those in Scotland with fewer cognitive resources 
were less likely to exploit the opportunity to express a nuanced choice.  In particular, 
those who scored less well on our knowledge quiz were significantly more likely to 
cast only one preference and to vote for only one party. There are also signs that 
those with fewer educational qualifications were somewhat more likely to behave in 
those ways. Much the same is true of those who said the ballot paper was very 
difficult to complete or that it was very difficult to understand how seats are 
allocated. However, only 5% of all respondents said the ballot paper was very 
difficult to complete while just 8% said the same of how seats were allocated, and 
consequently the distinctiveness of their behaviour is not statistically significant 
either. Meanwhile, there is little sign that those with less apparent capacity were 
more likely to vote for the straight party ticket. Indeed, if anything this was a 
behaviour in which those with more capacity were more likely to engage, and 
especially so those with rather more political knowledge. 
These patterns are little different from those in Ireland. There, those with primary 
only education were three times as likely as those with a degree to vote for just one 
party, though the equivalent pattern is absent when it comes to knowledge.7 Given 
that most voters in Ireland indicated more than one preference, large differences in 
the incidence of such behaviour were unlikely to be in evidence, and in practice 
none are, while as in Scotland there is no evidence at all that those with apparently 
less cognitive ability were more likely to vote a straight party ticket. In short, not 
only is there only limited evidence that those in Scotland with less cognitive capacity 
were especially likely to eschew the opportunities STV provides to express a more 
nuanced choice, but also it seems that in this respect voters in Scotland proved to be 
much the same as their counterparts in Ireland.  
5.2 A Lack of Motivation? 
Table 3 shows the incidence of the same three behaviours by three indicators of 
ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ in particular on the degree to which voters would, on 
the one hand, appear to have a strong motivation to behave in a partisan fashion 
and, on the other, to vote for a popular candidate.  
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽĨŽƵƌŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐŝƐǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƉĂƌƚǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?8 We expect 
strong identifiers to be more likely to vote for just one party and, faced with multiple 
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candidates from their first preference party, to vote the straight party ticket. Given 
their expected reluctance to vote for more than one party, and given that in some 
cases their preferred party may have only nominated one candidate, they might also 
be somewhat more likely to express just one preference. 
The second measure is the score a respondent gave their first preference party when 
asked to give it a mark out of ten to show how much they liked or disliked it. This 
information was only collected for the four largest parties in Scotland and the six 
biggest in Ireland, and thus the analysis is confined to those who gave their first 
preference to one of those parties (who comprise 82% and 89% of the sample of 
voters respectively). We would expect those who gave their party a high score to 
behave in a similar fashion to strong party identifiers. 
Our third measure is the score a respondent gave the candidate for whom they 
expressed a first preference when asked to give him or her a mark out of ten to 
show much they liked or disliked them. We would expect those voters who gave 
their first preference candidate a high score to be less likely to vote only for one 
party and to vote the straight party ticket, as they are voters upon whom at least 
one candidate has made a favourable impact as an individual.  They might also, as a 
result, be less likely to express just one preference. However, as highly partisan 
voters may well be inclined to give the candidate(s) standing for their party a high 
score, these patterns may only be apparent once we have taken into account the 
score respondents gave to their first preference party. It is those voters who give a 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞĂŚŝŐŚƐĐŽƌĞĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚŐŝǀĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇĂŚŝŐŚ
score who would seem most likely to behave on the basis of what they thought of 
one or more individual candidates rather than what they felt about the parties. 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
In Ireland, those with a relatively strong party attachment were significantly more 
likely to vote for only one party and to vote the straight ticket. In Scotland, in 
contrast, the differences between stronger and weaker identifiers are rather smaller 
(especially so in respect of voting a straight ticket) and given the (smaller) sample 
size are not significant. However, as expected, voters in Scotland who very much 
liked the party to which they gave their first preference vote were far more likely to 
vote for only one party and to vote a straight ticket. In this they were little different 
from their counterparts in Ireland. Meanwhile those who liked the particular 
candidate to whom they gave their first preference vote very much behaved in much 
the same way as those who did not, except that they appeared a little more likely to 
vote only for one party (albeit in Scotland not significantly so). However, given the 
need to disentangle the impact of candidate evaluations from those of party ones, 
this is a subject to which we will return in multivariate analysis that is presented 
below. 
So, while just as likely as anyone else to cast more than one preference, those in 
Scotland for whom a principal motivation for voting was to express support for a 
party they particularly liked were in other respects less likely to express a nuanced 
choice.  In this, however, they were little different from similarly motivated voters in 
Ireland. At the same time, though, this observation does not help us explain why the 
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overall incidence of straight ticket voting and voting only for one party was so much 
higher in Scotland than in Ireland. For contrary to what we might expect, in fact, 
rather more voters in Ireland (35%) than in Scotland (26%) gave the party of their 
first preference vote a high likeability score of nine or ten.  We evidently need to 
extend the scope of our investigation. 
5.3 A Question of Context? 
Indeed, as noted earlier, how voters use the ballot paper is unlikely simply to be a 
reflection of their individual capacity and motivation. It is also likely to be affected by 
the context in which they are voting. A voter whose party nominates more than one 
candidate might be expected to be less likely to cast only one preference but more 
likely to vote for one party only. A voter whose party is strong locally would seem to 
have less reason to do other than vote a straight party ticket, and thus to vote for 
more than one party. 
TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
Table 4 examines how far the incidence of casting only one preference and voting 
only for one party varied within the two countries by local context. Those in Scotland 
whose first preference party nominated more than one candidate were indeed 
significantly less likely to cast only one preference and more likely to vote just for 
one party. Equally, those living in wards where their preferred party was strong 
locally (as measured by the ƌĂƚŝŽŽĨƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǀŽƚĞƚŽ
the quota required locally to win a seat) were more likely to vote only for one party.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞůŽĐĂůƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨĂǀŽƚĞƌ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
party and casting just one vote is not significant, although the pattern is in the 
expected direction  W supporters of stronger parties were apparently more likely to 
vote for more than one candidate.  In addition to the analyses in the table, it is also 
the case in Scotland ƚŚĂƚǁŚĞƌĞĂǀŽƚĞƌ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉĂƌƚǇŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĞ
than one candidate and won more than 1.5 quotas on the first preference vote 
locally  W and thus was potentially in a position to secure the election of more than 
one candidate  W far more (55%) of its first preference voters voted the straight party 
ticket than did where such a party won less than 1.5 quotas (20%).  
Yet in exhibiting such patterns, Scotland was simply replicating behaviours that are 
equally evident in Ireland. There too, those whose first preference party nominated 
more than one candidate were significantly more likely to vote only for one party 
and less likely to express only one preference. Equally those whose first preference 
party was relatively strong locally were more likely to vote only for one party. In 
addition those whose first preference party won more than 1.5 quotas and 
nominated more than one candidate were rather more likely (47%) to vote a straight 
party ticket than those whose preferred party secured less than 1.5 quotas (39%).  
But while political context seems to have had much the same impact on voters in the 
two countries, the incidence of these different contexts was very different. 
ZĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĂƚĂůůŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐǁĂƌĚƐŽŶůǇĞůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚƌĞĞŽƌĨŽƵƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ
in Ireland 14 of the 42 Dáil Éireann constituencies then in existence elected five 
members, thereby meaning that a lower share of the vote is needed to meet the 
 11 
quota required to win a seat.. At the same time, ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐ
more fractured than ǁĂƐ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?Ɛin 2002.9 As a result, rather fewer voters in 
Scotland (28%) than in Ireland (36%) participated in a contest where their first 
preference party won more than 1.86 quotas. Equally these features of the STV 
system and the political landscape encouraged parties in Scotland to pursue 
relatively conservative nomination strategies; indeed in some instances the SNP in 
particular actually set their sights too low and nominated fewer candidates than the 
number of seats they were capable of winning (Denver and Bochel, 2007; Electoral 
Reform Society, 2008). In the event, no less than 43% of voters in Scotland voted for 
a party that fielded only one candidate, compared with just 23% in Ireland. 
Thus in some respects less choice was on offer to voters in Scotland than was 
available to those in Ireland. In particular, far fewer enjoyed the luxury of choosing 
between candidates of the same party. On the other hand, the keener competition 
for seats meant that vote transfers between parties were more likely to have some 
bearing on the eventual result, and voters in that situation locally appear to have 
responded accordingly.  But given that between them these two features of the 
Scottish election should have helped reduce the incidence of all three of the 
behaviours of apparent failure to express a nuanced choice we have been analysing 
so far, their higher overall incidence in Scotland evidently still remains to be 
explained. 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis 
So it appears that how voters use STV depends not just on their own capacities and 
motivation, but also on the structure and character of the choice on offer to them 
locally. Still, those who strongly like a particular party seem less inclined to express a 
more nuanced choice, while there were some hints that those with less apparent 
capacity might have been somewhat less likely to do so too. Evidently we should 
examine the relative importance of these apparent influences when considered 
together. We might wonder whether all of these features are indeed related to use 
of the ballot paper once we have taken the role of the other influences into account 
 W and in particular whether the limited evidence that those who would seem less 
able to cope with STV were less likely to exploit its potential does indeed prove to be 
robust in the face of such a test. At the same time, it will be remembered from our 
earlier discussion that we can only hope to identify the role that a strong liking for a 
particular candidate had on how people used the ballot paper once we have also 
taken into account how much they like their first preference party. 
In order to address these issues, we undertake a multivariate analysis of each the 
three kinds of behaviour we have been examining so far. The independent variables 
in each case are the indicators of capacity, motivation and context that we have 
examined so far (except that as the analysis of straight party ticket voting is confined 
to those whose first preference party nominated more than one candidate, the 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉĂƌƚǇŝƐ
omitted in that case).10 The results are shown in Table 5. These are logit estimations, 
as the dependent variable in each case is a dichotomy. 
TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
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The analysis confirms that there is some evidence that those in Scotland who might 
be thought to be less able to cope with a complex ballot paper were more likely to 
cast only one preference and to support only one party.  Those with few if any 
educational qualifications were significantly more likely than those who are 
relatively well qualified to do both. In addition, those who were less successful at 
answering the relevant knowledge quiz were significantly more likely to express only 
one preference.  
Nevertheless, these relationships are relatively weak. The biggest influence on 
whether people cast just one preference was whether or not their first preference 
party nominated more than one candidate.  Voters were far less likely to cast only 
one vote where their first preference party nominated more than one candidate. In 
addition, the electoral strength of that party locally also made a significant 
difference. Meanwhile, we can now also see that there is an indication that voters 
who rated their first preference candidate highly were, as we anticipated, less likely 
to vote for just one candidate.  
Equally, while those with fewer educational qualifications may have been more likely 
to confine their preferences to the candidates of one party, other considerations 
mattered too. First, voters were more likely to behave that way if their first 
preference party was locally electorally strong. Second, voters who liked their first 
preference party a great deal were inclined to vote only for candidates of that party 
while, once that relationship is accounted for, we can see that those who ranked 
their first preference candidate highly were less likely to do so.  In short, partisan 
voters often confined their preferences to their preferred party, while more 
candidate centred ones were less likely to do so. 
At the same time, the multivariate analysis clearly confirms our unexpected finding 
earlier that those with less knowledge were actually less likely to vote the straight 
ƉĂƌƚǇƚŝĐŬĞƚ ?,ĞƌĞĂůƐŽ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶƐŚŝƉƉůĂǇĞĚĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞ ?
Those who liked their first preference party a great deal were much more likely to 
vote the straight party ticket.  Indeed so strong is this relationship that perhaps we 
should not be surprised that it was more knowledgeable voters who engaged in such 
behaviour  W for more partisan voters are inclined to be knowledgeable, doubtless 
because their partisanship gives them a motivation to acquire political knowledge. 
Meanwhile, there is a striking similarity between the results for Scotland and those 
for Ireland. Those voters in Ireland with lower educational qualifications were more 
likely to express only one preference or to cast a vote for only one party (although 
level of political knowledge does not appear to have made any difference).  It seems 
that in Ireland too there is at least limited evidence, if no more, that apparently less 
able voters are less likely to use the full opportunity created by STV to express a 
more nuanced vote.  
However, the relationship between apparent capacity and engaging in single 
preference or single party voting is not necessarily the most important one. Rather, 
as in Scotland the most important reason why people only cast one preference is 
because their first preference party only nominated one candidate locally. In tandem 
with Scotland too, Irish voters are less likely to vote for more than one party if they 
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strongly like their first preference party or if their party is electorally strong locally.  
Meanwhile partisanship is clearly the primary source of straight ticket voting in 
Ireland while our indicators of capacity play no significant role at all  W again more or 
less mirroring the position in Scotland. 
So far then we have only uncovered limited support for the claim that some voters in 
the 2007 Scottish local elections might have lacked the capacity to use the new STV 
ballot paper to express a more nuanced preference  W and thus might have been 
considered confused. Moreover such apparent confusion was no more evident than 
in Ireland. The most important reason why voters in Scotland only cast one 
preference was, just as in Ireland, because their preferred party only nominated one 
candidate. MeanǁŚŝůĞǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶƐŚŝƉƉůĂǇĞĚĂŬĞǇƌŽůĞŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ
how many parties they supported or whether they voted the straight party ticket. 
Voters, it seems, are more likely to fail to exploit the opportunities afforded by STV 
to express a more nuanced choice not so much because they were confused but, 
rather, because of the nature of the choice on offer or because they lacked the 
motivation to do so.  But what about what might be regarded as perhaps the least 
desirable of all the four behaviours we are assessing in this paper  W that the order in 
which voters cast their ballot is determined by the position that candidates appear 
on the ballot paper? 
6. Alphabetic Voting 
In our discussion of Table 1 we noted that 60% of our respondents in Scotland who 
cast more than one preference gave their first preference vote to a candidate who 
was placed more highly on the ballot paper than the candidate to whom they gave 
their second preference. Other things being equal, if the position of the candidates 
on the ballot did not influence the order in which voters placed the candidates, we 
would have expected that only 50% would behave in this way. 
However, Table 6 does not suggest that such behaviour was the particular preserve 
of those in Scotland with less apparent ability to cope with an STV ballot paper. 
Those who scored relatively well on our knowledge score were just as likely to vote 
alphabetically as those who performed less well, while there is no apparent 
association between education and alphabetic voting at all. It seems that we cannot 
blame the tendency of voters to vote alphabetically on their inability to cope with 
the ballot paper.  
TABLE 6 NEAR HERE 
Instead we secure a vital clue as to the source of this behaviour if we compare its 
incidence amongst those whose party nominated more than one candidate with 
those voting for a lone candidate (all independents are seen as lone in this sense). 
Amongst the former no less than 67% voted alphabetically; of the remainder only 
53% did so. Moreover this 67% rises to 70% amongst straight-ticket voters. It will be 
recalled from Table 5 that the tendency to vote the straight party ticket was very 
much the preserve of those voters who strongly liked one particular party. Thus it 
seems that for the most part the incidence of alphabetical voting in the 2007 
Scottish local elections was a consequence of the behaviour of voters whose 
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preferred party had nominated more than one candidate locally and whose only key 
concern was to express their support for that party.  
In contrast, in Ireland, where alphabetic voting was no more common than would be 
expected by chance, voters who cast a straight party ticket were not significantly 
more likely than those who did not to give their first preference vote to a candidate 
placed higher up the ballot paper than the candidate to whom they gave their 
second preference.  All that can be discerned is that those voting for large parties 
and those backing parties who nominated more than one candidate were more 
likely to have voted alphabetically. Even though the overall incidence of such 
behaviour may have been low, perhaps some Irish voters were influenced by the 
order of the candidates on the ballot paper when faced with the particular 
circumstance of multiple candidates standing for a relatively large party. 
TABLE 7 NEAR HERE 
Table 7, which shows the results of two models of alphabetical voting in each of the 
two countries, affirms these two pictures. The first model in each case includes in its 
set oĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉĂƌƚǇ
locally, the second whether the respondent voted a straight ticket  W the two 
variables cannot be included in the same model because they are so heavily 
intercorrelated. In Scotland alphabetic voting was significantly higher amongst those 
supporting a locally big party, but it was even more clearly so amongst those who 
voted a straight party ticket. /ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŶŽŶĞŽĨŽƵƌŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĂƌĞ
significantly associated with the phenomenon. Equally, as in the Scottish case, there 
is no evidence that Irish voters with lower educational qualifications or less 
knowledge were more likely to engage in alphabetical voting. On the other hand, in 
contrast to Scotland, it seems that while those in Ireland supporting a locally larger 
ƉĂƌƚǇǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽǀŽƚĞ ‘ĚŽǁŶ ?ƚŚĞďĂůůŽƚƉĂĞƌ ?ƚŚŽƐĞwho voted the straight 
party ticket were not more likely to do so.   
7. A Pooled Analysis 
We can compare the behaviour of voters in the two countries more formally by 
undertaking a pooled analysis of the two sets of data combined. This is undertaken 
in Table 8. Such an analysis allows us to test systematically for differences between 
the two countries in the pattern of the behaviours we have been examining. It also 
enables us to assess how far we have accounted for the difference in the incidence 
of those behaviours.  
To highlight the coefficients of interest more clearly the table only displays the 
interaction terms for Scotland together with the coefficient for the effect of living in 
Scotland rather than Ireland; the main coefficients in each case are simply the 
coefficients for Ireland shown in the relevant column of Table 5 or Table 7. If an 
interaction between living in Scotland and any of our independent variables is 
significant then this indicates that the pattern of behaviour in Scotland in respect of 
that variable was significantly different from that in Ireland. Meanwhile if the 
constant term for living in Scotland is significant, this indicates that the overall 
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incidence of the behaviour in question differs between the two countries for reasons 
that our analysis has not fully uncovered.  
First we should consider whether there are any significant interactions in respect of 
knowledge and education that might suggest that cognitive capacity played a more 
important role in Scotland than in Ireland - and that thus voters in Scotland were at 
apparently greater risk of being confused.  As we would anticipate from the results 
we have presented so far, there proves to be no significant difference between the 
two countries in the relationship between these variables and only expressing one 
preference or voting for just one party. In the case of straight party ticket voting, 
however, there is an interaction between knowledge and being a Scottish voter; less 
knowledgeable voters in Scotland were somewhat more likely to vote the straight 
party ticket. But at the same time an interaction term that appears in the analysis of 
voting alphabetically suggests a tendency, albeit only a very modest one, for less 
educated voters in Scotland to be less likely to behave in that way. All in all, it seems 
difficult on the basis of this evidence to argue that voters in Scotland were especially 
confused about how to mark an STV ballot. 
All of the other interactions that prove to be significant in the table are ones we 
might have anticipated from the informal comparison we have already undertaken 
of the separate analyses for each country. In Scotland straight ticket voting is less the 
preserve of strong party identifiers while being a straight ticket voter leads Scottish 
voters to vote alphabetically in the way that it is not true of their counterparts in 
Ireland. Meanwhile only casting one vote and only voting for one party was 
particularly less likely to occur in Scotland amongst those who rated a candidate 
strongly. Perhaps in Scotland voters were more likely to need the stimulus of a high 
regard for at least one candidate in order to induce them to use the ballot paper to 
express a more nuanced choice, whereas for voters in Ireland behaving in that way is 
rather more of a habit. 
Moreover it was a stimulus that in practice relatively few voters in Scotland received. 
Only 17% gave their first preference candidate a score of nine or ten, whereas no 
less than 37% of voters in Ireland did so. Yet even when we take his difference into 
account, we have still not fully accounted for either the greater tendency of voters in 
Scotland to cast only one preference or for the greater likelihood that they vote for 
only one party.11 The Scotland term in the model for both these behaviours proves 
to be positive and significant. It would seem that even after taking into account their 
capacity, motivation and the context in which they were voting, the average voter in 
Scotland was still simply inclined to regard the election as an occasion to choose 
either just one candidate or just one party.  
8. Conclusion 
Voters in the 2007 Scottish local elections did not make as much use of the STV 
ballot paper to express a more nuanced candidate centred choice as voters are 
inclined to do in Ireland.  They were more likely to cast only one vote, to vote only 
for one party and to vote the straight party ticket, while there is clear evidence of 
alphabetical voting that is not apparent in Ireland.  However, it seems we cannot 
blame this difference of behaviour on confusion amongst those voters who might be 
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thought less likely to have the capacity to cope with a more complex ballot paper. 
True, there is some evidence that such voters were more likely just to express one 
preference or to vote for one party, but this relationship is a relatively weak one, 
and was no more evident in Scotland in 2007 than it was in Ireland in 2002. Perhaps 
it has to be accepted that some kinds of voters are always a little less likely to use an 
STV ballot paper to express a more nuanced choice, but this pattern is probably not 
sufficiently strong to be regarded as a major objection to the use of STV. 
Still, it seems that voters in Scotland  W at all levels of knowledge and education  W 
may still have some learning to do about how they might vote to best effect under 
STV. Despite the fact that more of them than their Irish counterparts found 
themselves voting in a contest where their first preference party was locally weak - 
and thus in a situation where their vote was more likely to be transferred to another 
candidate or party during the count  W voters in Scotland were still more likely both 
to cast only one preference and to confine their preferences to the candidates of 
one party.   It appears that some voters in Scotland carried the habit of making a 
single choice formed under first past the post with them to the local STV ballot box.  
It seems too that voters in Scotland were more likely than their counterparts in 
Ireland to need the stimulus of the presence of a strong local candidate if they were 
to be persuaded not simply to cast one preference or confine their preferences to 
one party. Moreover, that stimulus was absent for most Scottish voters, a 
consequence perhaps of the fact that they were voting in a less salient local election 
that took place on the same day as a Scottish Parliament contest. 
But of all the behaviours we have analysed, it is perhaps the incidence of alphabetic 
voting in Scotland that would seem to give most reason for concern amongst the 
advocates of STV. Such behaviour is the very opposite of the candidate centred 
choice that the system is meant to promote and appears to turn the chances of 
being elected into a lottery based on family name, or whatever other principle is 
used to determine the order of candidates on the ballot paper (Denver et al., 2009). 
True, alphabetic voting did not occur in Scotland because of the inability of voters to 
cope with the new system. Rather it was primarily the preserve of those voters who 
faced with more than one candidate from their preferred party wanted to do no 
more than vote the straight party ticket. These were typically relatively partisan 
voters who liked their first preference party a lot and for whom party was all and 
candidate seemingly mattered little. 
We noted at the beginning of this article that it has long been evident from the 
divergent experiences of Ireland and Malta that STV is only as candidate centred a 
system as voters make it. And the incidence of straight party ticket voting in Scotland 
was certainly not sufficiently high to suggest that candidate did not matter at all, 
even on its first outing in that country. But for some voters it evidently did not 
matter a great deal  W and as a result where a party nominated more than one 
candidate, those placed lower on the ballot paper were at a distinct disadvantage. 
Perhaps the lesson is that candidates need to become more visible, a task that may 
be made easier by the decision of the Scottish Government to hold future local 
elections on a different day than Scottish Parliament elections, a decision first 
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implemented in May 2012. But perhaps too the remedy for this apparent ill lies in 
the hands of the parties themselves. If voters are partisan but indifferent between 
candidates, they should be amenable to being advised how to order their ballot 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ŚŽǁƚŽǀŽƚĞ ?ĐĂƌĚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ůess than one in five Scottish voters 
whose first preference party nominated more than one candidate recalled receiving 
such advice, much lower than the equivalent figure of 30% in Ireland. It may not be 
what its advocates intended, but vote management may yet need to become an 
important feature of STV in Scottish local elections ŝĨƐŽŵĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ?ĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨ
being elected are not to seem like an alphabetic lottery. 
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Table 1 Incidence of Various Kinds of Ballot Paper Behaviour, Scotland 2007 and 
Ireland 2002 
 Scotland Ireland 
 % % 
Cast Only 1 Preference 22 
(703) 
6 
(1831) 
Voted Only for 1 Party 41 
(703) 
19 
(1831) 
Voted Straight Party Ticket 57 
(307) 
45 
(1270) 
Voted Down Ballot Paper 60 
(540) 
51 
(1734) 
Figures in brackets are number of cases upon which percentage based. 
Only Cast 1 Preference: Voter reported only casting a first preference vote 
Only Voted for 1 Party: Voter only expressed preferences for candidates of one party (Independents regarded as a party) 
Voted Straight Party Ticket: Voter ranked all candidates of first preference party (in any order) above candidates of any other 
party. Figures based on those voters whose first preference party nominated more than one candidate in their ward. 
sŽƚĞĚŽǁŶĂůůŽƚWĂƉĞƌ ?sŽƚĞƌ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚůŽǁĞƌĚŽǁŶƚŚĞďĂůůŽƚƉĂƉĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƌĨŝƌƐƚ
preference candidate. Figures based on those who cast more than one preference. 
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Table 2. Use of STV Ballot Paper by Indicators of Capacity 
 
 Scotland Ireland 
 Cast Only 
1 
Preference 
Voted 
Only 
for 1 
Party 
Voted 
Straight 
Party 
Ticket 
Cast Only 
1 
Preference 
 Voted 
Only for 
1 Party 
Voted 
Straight 
Party 
Ticket 
 % % % % % % 
Highest 
Educational 
Qualification 
      
  Higher (S)/ 
  Leaving  
  Certificate (I) 
or above 
19 36 58 5 15 41 
Less than  
Higher (S)/ 
  Leaving  
  Certificate 
(I) 
27 47 52 7 24 48 
 (.05) (.05) (ns) (ns) (.01) (.10) 
Knowledge 
Quiz Score 
      
 Low 28 48 49 7 80 44 
 High 18 36 64 5 82 47 
 (.05) (.01) (.05) (ns) (ns) (ns) 
Perceived 
Difficulty of 
Completing 
Ballot Paper 
      
  Not at all  20 42 64    
  Not very 21 39 56    
  Fairly 23 38 52    
  Very 45 65 54    
 (ns) (ns) (ns)    
Perceived 
Difficulty of 
Understanding 
Seat 
Allocation 
      
  Not at all  14 36 65    
  Not very 21 38 52    
  Fairly 24 43 54    
  Very 33 51 63    
 (ns) (ns) (ns)    
In Scotland tŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƋƵŝǌƐĐŽƌĞŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐǁŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚƚŽƐƚĂƚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ particular statements 
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were true or false. These statements were: The Scottish Executive makes most of the decisions about how much money should be 
spent on the health service in Scotland; The Scottish Executive decides the level of unemployment benefit paid to people in Scotland; 
The Scottish Parliament has around 70 elected members; The Scottish Executive is just another name for the Scottish Parliament. In 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽŶĞǁĂƐĂĚĚĞĚƚŽĂƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĐŽƌĞŝĨƚŚĞǇƐĂŝĚŝƚǁĂƐƚƌƵĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞŝn the case of the three 
remaining statements one was aded if they said it was false.  
In Ireland the quiz sciore was derived fom responses to the following multiple choice questions: Can you tell me who was the 
leader of Fianna Fáil during the recent general election campaign? ((1)Charlie McCreevy W(2)Brian Cowen W(3)Charlie Haughey W
(4)Bertie Ahern); The Green Party recently elected a leader for the first time. Could you tell me who that is? ((1)Patricia 
McKenna WJ(2)ohn Gormley W(3)Trevor Sargent W(4)Roger Garland); Who was the leader of Fine Gael during the recent general 
election campaign? ((1)Jim Mitchell W(2)John Bruton W(3)Michael Noonan W(4)Alan Dukes); Who was the Ceann Comhairle in the 
Dåil (Speaker of the Dáil) during the last Dåil 1997 W2002? ((1)Sean Tracey W(2)ĞƐK ?DĂůůĞǇ W(3)Sean Doherty W(4)Seamus 
Pattison); tŚŽŝƐ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌ ?((1)David Byrne W(2)Maire Geoghan Quinn W(3)Barry Desmond W(4)Padraig 
Flynn). The correct responses meriting one mark are answers 4, 3, 3, 4 and 2 respectively 
Figures in brackets indicate the level at which a F2 test of the differences in the proportions immediately above is significant. ns 
= not significant.  
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Table 3 Use of STV Ballot Paper in by Indicators of Motivation 
 
 Scotland Ireland 
 Cast Only 1 
Preference 
 Voted 
Only for 
1 Party 
Voted 
Straight 
Party 
Ticket 
Cast Only 1 
Preference 
Voted 
Only 
for 1 
Party 
Voted 
Straight 
Party 
Ticket 
 % % % % % % 
Party ID       
 Strong 21 44 60 6 24 63 
 Weak/None 24 39 53 6 17 37 
 (ns) (ns) (ns) (ns) (.01) (.01) 
Likeability 
Score of 1st 
pref. party 
      
  9/10 25 55 73 6 29 61 
  7/8 18 39 61 4 17 42 
  0/6 21 28 32 7 13 27 
 (ns) (.01) (.01) (ns) (.01) (.01) 
Likeability 
Score of 1st 
pref. 
candidate 
      
  9/10 25 50 54 5 24 49 
  7/8 16 38 60 2 14 48 
  0/6 26 41 54 4 16 41 
 (ns) (ns) (ns) (ns) (.01) (ns) 
Data for Likeability Score of 1st. preference party based only on those who cast a 1st preference for a major party candidate. On 
the definition of strong and weak identifiers see fn. 7. 
Figures in brackets indicate the level at which a F2 test of the differences in the proportions immediately above is significant. ns 
= not significant.  
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Table 4 Use of STV Ballot Paper by Indicators of Context 
 
 Scotland Ireland 
 Cast Only 1 
Preference 
Voted Only for 
1 Party 
Cast Only 1 
Preference 
Voted Only for 
1 Party 
 % % % % 
Size of 1st pref. 
party 
    
   > 1.86 quotas 16 53 5 31 
 0.86-1.86 
quotas 
25 42 6 16 
  <0.86 quota 24 25 6 10 
 (ns) (.01) (ns) (.01) 
1st pref. party 
nominated 
more than 1 
candidate 
    
 Yes 14 48 3 21 
 No 33 33 7 9 
 (.01) (.01 (.01) (.01) 
 ‘YƵŽƚĂ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽǁŝŶĂƐĞĂƚůŽĐĂůůǇ ?/ŶĂƚŚƌĞĞŵĞŵďĞƌǁĂƌĚƚŚŝƐŝƐŽŶĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ?A?ŽĨƚhe 
vote and in a four member one, one more than 20%. Thus in a three member ward a party is deemed to have won 1.86 quotas 
if it has secured 46.5% of the first preference vote while in a four member one the equivalent figure is 37.2%. Meanwhile 0.86 
of a quota represents  21.5% of the first preference vote in a four member ward and 17.2% in a three member one.  
Figures in brackets indicate the level at which a F2 test of the differences in the proportions immediately above is significant. ns 
= not significant. 
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Table 5 Multivariate Analysis of Use of STV Ballot Paper 
  Scotland Ireland 
 Cast Only 1 
preference 
Voted for 
Only 1 
Party 
Voted 
Straight 
Party Ticket 
Cast  Only 1 
Preference 
Voted for 
Only 1 
Party 
Vote 
Straight 
Party Ticket 
Low Education 0.395* 0.355* -0.289 0.880** 0.525*** 0.094 
 (0.238) (0.198) (0.267) (0.305) (0.147) (0.132) 
Low Knowledge 0.457* -0.314 0.609** 0.091 -0.144 0.075 
 (0.235) (0.198) (0.267) (0.297) (0.147) (0.131) 
Strong party ID -0.0682 -0.111 -0.388 0.065 0.0737 0.728*** 
 (0.245) (0.206) (0.284) (0.342) (0.161) (0.100) 
1
st
 pref. party 
likeability score 
0.248 0.631*** 0.953*** 0.098 0.479*** 0.752*** 
 (0.166) (0.144) (0.209) (0.222) (0.115) (0.101) 
1
st
 pref. candidate 
likeability score 
-0.382** -0.309** -0.226 -0.178 0.0692 -0.263** 
 (0.177) (0.143) (0.187) (0.239) (0.117) (0.104) 
1st pref. party size 0.574** 0.485*** 0.965 0.053 0.514*** 0.164 
 (0.225) (0.186) (1.164) (0.274) (0.133) (0.155) 
1
st
 pref. party 
nominated more 
than 1 candidate  
-1.683*** 0.206 na -1.295** 0.300 na 
 (0.321) (0.253)  (0.443) (0.278)  
Constant -1.109 -2.269*** -3.217  -3.234*** -4.357*** -1.752*** 
 (0.545) (0.464) (2.365) (0.653) (0.383) (0.350) 
Observations 500 500 269 1,411 1,411 1,096 
R
2
 0.088 0.073 0.089 0.051 0.081 0.091 
Main cell entries are coefficients. Figures in brackets are standard errors 
*** =p<.001  ** p< .01  * p<.05 
na not applicable- variable not entered. 
Analysis based on major party voters only. Third column in both countries based only on those major party voters whose 1st 
preference party put up more than 1 candidate. 
Low education: in Scotland, not having the equivalent of a standard grade 1-3. In Ireland, not having a leaving certificate.  
Low knowledge: In Scotland, answered no more than one of the knowledge quiz items correctly. In Ireland answered no more 
than two correctly. 
1st pref. party likeability score: An interval level variable where an original score of 9 or 10 is coded 3, a score of 7 or 8 is coded 
 ? ?ĂŶĚĂůůŽƚŚĞƌǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁƐare set to missing. 
1st pref. candidate likeability score: As for 1st pref. party score, except that ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƐĂŝĚ ‘ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ĂůƐŽĐŽĚĞĚ ? ? 
Strong party id: In Scotland, identify fairly or very strongly with a party. In Ireland, feel close to a party. For further details see 
fn. 7.  
1st pref. party size: In the first two columns in both countries this is an interval level variable where 1=less than 0.86 of a quota, 
2=between 0.86 and 1.86 quotas, and 3=more than 1.86 quotas. In the third column, this is a dichotomous variable that 
distinguishes between more and less than 1.5 quotas.  
1st pref party nominated more than one candidate: Party for whom respondent cast a first preference nominated more than 
one ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ? 
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Table 6. Incidence of Alphabetically Ordered Voting by Indicators of Capacity, 
Motivation and Context 
 
 Scotland 
 
Ireland 
 
 % % 
Highest Educational Qualification   
  Higher (S)/Leaving Certificate (I) or above 60 49 
  Less than Higher (S)/Leaving Certificate (I) 60 54 
 (ns) (.10) 
   
Knowledge Quiz Score   
 Low 58 52 
 High 59 51 
 (ns) (ns) 
Party identification   
High 64 55 
Low 56 50 
 (ns) (ns) 
Likeability Score of 1st pref. party   
  9/10 57 56 
  7/8 56 50 
  0/6 59 51 
 (ns) (ns) 
Likeability Score of 1st pref. candidate   
  9/10 54 52 
  7/8 57 48 
  0/6 63 57 
 (ns) (ns) 
Size of 1st. pref. party   
   > 1.86 quotas 64 56 
 0.86-1.86 quotas 58 53 
  <0.86 quota 58 44 
 (ns) (.01) 
1st pref. party nominated more than 1 candidate   
Yes 67 55 
No 53 39 
 (.01) (.001) 
Voted straight party ticket   
Yes 70 55 
No 61 57 
 (.01) (ns) 
On the definition ŽĨ ‘ƋƵŽƚĂ ?ƐĞĞƚŚĞŶŽƚĞƚŽdĂďůĞ ? ? 
Figures in brackets indicate the level at which a F2 test of the differences in the proportions immediately above is significant. ns 
= not significant. 
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Table 7 Multivariate Analysis of Alphabetically Ordered Voting  
 Scotland Ireland 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Low Education -0.201 -0.187 0.089 0.121 
 (0.215) (0.216) (0.114) (0.112) 
Low Knowledge -0.114 -0.201 -0.002 0.013 
 (0.217) (0.219) (0.111) (0.111) 
Strong party ID 0.241 0.295 0.119 0.122 
 (0.222) (0.224) (0.128) (0.129) 
1
st
 pref. party likeability score -0.108 -0.230 0.057 0.074 
 (0.153) (0.160) (0.082) (0.083) 
1
st
 pref. candidate likeability score -0.115 -0.055 -0.084 -0.082 
 (0.150) (0.148) (0.087) (0.087) 
1
st
 pref. party size 0.394**  0.204**
* 
 
 (0.155)  (0.073)  
Voted straight ticket 0.723***  0.101 
  (0.227)  (0.120) 
Constant -0.060 0.634 -0.369 -0.023 
 (0.465) (0.393) (0.246) (0.211) 
     
Observations 393 393 1,361 1,361 
Pseudo R
2
 0.017 0.024 0.007 0.003 
Main cell entries are coefficients. Figures in brackets are standard errors 
*** =p<.001  ** p< .01  * p<.05 
Table based on major party voters who cast more than one preference. 
Voted Straight Party Ticket: Voter ranked all candidates of first preference party (in any order) above candidates of any other 
party. 
All other variables coded as in Table 5. 
 30 
Table 8 Pooled analysis of use of STV ballot paper in Scotland and Ireland. 
 
Cast Only 1 
preference 
Voted Only for 
1 party 
Voted Straight 
Party Ticket 
Voted 
Down 
Ballot 
Paper 
Low educational qualifications * 
SCOTLAND 
-0.485 -0.170 -0.383 -0.366* 
 (0.387) (0.246) (0.298) (0.212) 
Low Knowledge * SCOTLAND 0.548 -0.170 0.537* -0.077 
 (0.379) (0.246) (0.298) (0.213) 
Strong party id * SCOTLAND 0.133 -0.185 -1.182***  
 (0.421) (0.261) (0.145)  
1
st
 pref. party likeability score* 
SCOTLAND 
0.346 0.152 0.225  
 (0.276) (0.184) (0.232)  
1
st
 pref. candidate likeability 
score * SCOTLAND 
0.560* -0.379** -0.038  
 (0.297) (0.185) (0.214)  
1
st
 pref party size *  SCOTLAND -0.521 -0.028 -0.802  
 (0.355) (0.228) (1.17)  
1
st
 pref. party nominated more 
than 1 cand * SCOTLAND 
-0.388 -0.094   
 (0.547) (0.376)   
Voted straight ticket * SCOTLAND    0.451** 
    (0.228 
SCOTLAND 1.730*** 2.089*** -1.465 0.229 
 (0.84) (0.60) (2.391) (0.205) 
Observations 1911 1911 1365 2223 
Pseudo R
2 
0.185 0.116 0.094 0.005 
Main cell entries are coefficients. Figures in brackets are standard errors. Main effects not shown. *** =p<0.01  ** p< 0.05  * 
p<0.1.  
For definition of independent variables see notes to Tables 5 and 7. Straight party ticket is coded dichotomously as in Table 7 
columns 3 and 6. Those whose first preference party fielded only one candidate are coded here as not voting a straight ticket. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 Meanwhile in elections to the Australian Senate, in which STV is also used, voters can simply make 
one mark to indicate that they accept an ordering of the candidates that is proposed by their party, an 
option that nearly all voters now take (Reilly and Maley, 2000).  
2
 This, of course, is not the only example of the use of STV in a local or other sub-state election in a 
country where the system is not used in statewide elections. The system is used in all elections in 
Northern Ireland other than to the House of Commons, and is or has been used in some local elections 
in the USA, Canada, New Zealand and India (Farrell et al., 1996; Johnston and Koene, 2000; Bush 
2002). 
3
 Only a handful of voters in Scotland might previously have had experience of using STV in such an 
election, either as a voter in a university constituency before 1945 or in an election to the separate local 
education authorities that had a brief existence on Scotland in the 1920s and were elected by STV 
(Lakeman, 1974). 
4
 For further details see the technical documentation of the 2007 Scottish Social Attitudes survey at 
www.esds.ac.uk and of the Irish National Election Study at www.tcd.ie/ines 
5
 The figure for Scotland represents 80% of all those who said they had voted in the local election. In 
Ireland the figure constitutes 91% of those who said they had voted. 
6
 In Scotland as many as 53% were unable to answer more than one of the knowledge quiz question 
correctly and so in the table we have divided the Scottish sample at that median point. In Ireland the 
nearest equivalent dividing line was two correct responses, which divided the sample into two almost 
equally sized halves. 
7
 Such people would have typically been older than the average, as secondary education became free 
from the late 1960s. 
8
 It should be noted that party identification was measured differently on the two surveys. In Scotland 
WKHGLUHFWLRQRISDUW\LGHQWLILFDWLRQZDVREWDLQHGE\DVNLQJILUVWµGenerally speaking, do you think of 
\RXUVHOIDVDVXSSRUWHURIDQ\RQHSROLWLFDOSDUW\"¶7KRVHZKRGLGQRWUHply affirmatively were then 
DVNHGµ'R\RXWKLQNRI\RXUVHOIDVDOLWWOHFORVHUWRRQHSROLWLFDOSDUW\WKDQWKHRWKHUV"¶7KRVHZKR
VWLOOGLGQRWVWDWHDSDUW\DWWKDWVWDJHZHUHDVNHGµ,IWKHUHZHUHDJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQWRPRUURZZKLFK
political party do yRXWKLQN\RXZRXOGEHPRVWLQFOLQHGWRVXSSRUW"¶7KRVHZKRQDPHGDSDUW\LQ
UHVSRQVHWRDQ\RIWKHVHWKUHHTXHVWLRQVZHUHWKHQDVNHGµ:RXOG\RXFDOO\RXUVHOIYHU\VWURQJ>SDUW\
WKH\KDYHQDPHG@IDLUO\VWURQJRUQRWYHU\VWURQJ"7KRVHZKRUHVSRQGµYHU\ VWURQJ¶RUµIDLUO\VWURQJ¶
LQDQVZHUWRWKLVODVWTXHVWLRQDUHUHJDUGHGDVµVWURQJ¶LGHQWLILHUV,Q,UHODQGUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHG
µ'R\RXXVXDOO\WKLQNRI\RXUVHOIDVFORVHWRDQ\SROLWLFDOSDUW\"¶,IWKH\UHVSRQGHGDIILUPDWLYHO\WKH\
were then askedµ'R\RXIHHOYHU\FORVHWRWKLVSDUW\VRPHZKDWFORVHRUQRWYHU\FORVH"¶,IWKH\
UHVSRQGHGQHJDWLYHO\WRWKHILUVWTXHVWLRQWKH\ZHUHDVNHGµ'R\RXIHHODOLWWOHFORVHUWRRQHRIWKH
SROLWLFDOSDUWLHVWKDQWKHRWKHUV"¶7KRVHZKRDQVZHUHGµ<HV¶WR the first of these questions are 
FODVVLILHGKHUHDVDµVWURQJ¶LGHQWLILHU$VDUHVXOWRIDSSO\LQJWKHVHSURFHGXUHVRIUHVSRQGHQWVLQ
Scotland who completed the mock ballot paper and 26% in Ireland were classified as strong identifiers.  
9
 The effective number of parties in terms of votes across Scotland as a whole in 2007 was 4.75, 
whereas in Ireland in 2002 the equivalent figure was 3.99. 
10
 Subjective feelings about the ballot paper and the system of seat allocation in Scotland are omitted, 
as these questions were not asked in Ireland. As they did not prove to be significant in the bivariate 
analysis, their omission is unlikely to have any material consequence for our results. 
11
 Note also that this is also despite the fact that our analysis has also taken into account the fact that, as 
noted earlier, fewer voters in Scotland live in a ward where their first preference is locally large (a 
feature that should have depressed the incidence of both behaviours; see Table 5), and that rather more 
voters in ScRWODQGWKDQLQ,UHODQGDUHFODVVLILHGE\XVDVKDYLQJDµORZHGXFDWLRQ¶D
feature that had the opposite effect). In the case of casting only preference this is also despite the fact 
that we have taken into account the fact that fewer voters in Scotland live in wards that nominated 
more than one candidate (a feature that made casting a single preference more likely).  
